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Work significantly affects human life and health. Overworking may decrease the quality of 
life and cause direct economic losses. Technological innovations encourage modernization of 
firms’ capital and improve labor productivity in the workplace. The paper investigates the 
optimal individual choice of work intensity under improving technology embodied in new 
equipment leading to shorter lifetime of capital goods (obsolescence). The balanced growth 
trajectories are analyzed in this context to find out, in particular, how the optimal choice of 
work intensity is tied to the rate of embodied technological change. The impact of embodied 
technological advances on the work/life balance problem is discussed and their 
macroeconomic consequences are highlighted. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Work has been an economic necessity for people for centuries. At the same time, overworking 
may cause fatigue and missing recreational opportunities that, as a result, lead to illnesses, 
direct economic losses (in the form of missing work and extra medical expenses), and shorten 
the lifespan of individuals. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s quality-of-life index1 considers 
healthiness (determined by the life expectancy) as the first of their nine major indicators, 
followed by the family life and the community life, while the economic prosperity (material 
wellbeing) is the fourth indicator. Then, what is the optimal balance between working hours 
and leisure time that can be spent with family and in recreation facilities? Recent surveys in 
many European countries show that people are willing to work less and sacrifice a part of 
their earnings in order to improve their style of life and spend more time on leisure activities. 
Simultaneously, the academic literature2,3 is full of cases and general studies highlighting 
indicators of the quality of a working life such as job involvement, work role conflict, work 
role overload, job stress, and turn-over intentions. Thus, particular attention is paid to the 
impact of work time and working conditions on health.  There is a clear “work-life balance” 
to identify, and this is not an easy problem to tackle as it involves a wide range of 
socioeconomic, psychological and biological factors (deriving from age and gender)4. In this 
paper, we shall present the economic approach to this balance problem. Although the rational 
individual choice of working intensity has been analyzed in the economic models with 
endogenous labor supply5-7, it remains an open topic of debates8.  We shall take this analytical 
avenue here. Needless to say, there are other approaches to the work-life balance. Guest4 
enumerates five alternative models in the psychological literature. Though these models 4,9 are 
essentially descriptive, they do highlight fundamental factors in the balance problem under 
scrutiny. The analytical approach presented in this paper has the virtue of providing clear-cut 
mathematical results but it has its own drawbacks deriving from the fact that it is built on 
strict individual rationality criteria. 
A very important question in the literature on the work-life balance is the role of 
technological progress. Technological innovations affect different aspects of human life and 
definitely impact the working conditions and work intensity. An interesting open question is 
whether the technological development and related modernization of working conditions lead 
to a decrease or increase of the time that people are willing to work. This question is much 
less trivial than what it might appear at the first glance. Indeed, one might think that, for 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
example, the rise of information technologies would ease the balance and simplify the 
problem faced by individuals in modern societies. In practice, this is far from being granted.  
It has been shown that information technologies have indeed favored a series of 
organizational changes, in particular, towards multitasking (see a summary of this 
organizational change in the US10 and a related analytical work11).  However, these changes 
have not necessarily improved the quality of working life, and, therefore, they have not 
changed the tradeoff between work and life in a clear-cut way as one would have expected 
(see 12 for the French case). Our analytical work tackles the balance problem between work 
and life (or leisure) under the assumption of embodied technological progress, that is, when 
only the newest capital goods are the vehicle of technological progress, a deep characteristic 
of information technologies. The most natural model to incorporate this feature is the vintage 
capital model where the date of capital production also determines the technology embodied. 
In this context, we will study how economic agents will choose their work intensity, that 
is, their arbitrage between work and life. To our knowledge, with the exception of 13, this 
paper is the first one studying work intensity choice in such a technological context. Earlier 
vintage capital models by R.Solow14 and developed in other literature15-20 do not include work 
intensity choice.  For instance, a linear problem13 does not actually characterize individual 
behavior, labor intensity being fixed by a central planning collective choice.  
The major advantage of the vintage capital approach is an explicit description of the 
capital modernization process, including the removal of obsolete assets (capital replacement). 
In contrast to traditional models with homogenous capital, an acceleration in the rate of 
(embodied) technical progress leads to shorter capital goods' lifetime, namely, to the 
scrapping of the oldest and obsolete machines. How would the labor demand and supply 
decisions get altered in the latter non-standard context? As mentioned above, the vintage 
literature has so far focused on labor demand by firms. Here we look at the suppliers’ side, 
under the assumption of clearing labor market. To keep the analysis simple, we do not 
introduce organizational and human capital costs associated to the scrapping of the obsolete 
equipment. Despite this simplification, the model allows to bring out several benchmark 
implications of embodied technical progress for optimal work intensity, and, therefore, for the 
work/life balance problem. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces and analyzes the model. Steady-
state analysis and balanced growth regime are provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
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Some important supplementary results obtained during the investigation are presented in 
Appendix.   
 
2. Description and analysis of the model 
 
Following the concept of decentralized economy with individual rational behavior, we 
consider a system that consists of identical individual workers and a number of identical firms 
in a perfect competitive market.  
 
2.1 Modeling of the individual choice  
 
Individuals work, receive wages, buy goods for consumption, and make savings generated by 
the initial wealth and labor income8. Suppose, all of them have the same preferences, are 
equally productive, and receive the same wage rate w(t). The novelty of our study is a 
consideration of the labor/leisure ratio. Namely, we assume that the individuals choose their 
work intensity N(t) and the level of individual consumption c(t) to maximize their overall 
future utility: 
 
             
dtNce t
Nc
][lnmax
0
,
θρ −∫
∞
−
         ,0   ,0 >> ρθ                                      (1) 
 
The utility (1) reflects an aggregate numerical measure of the individual’s quality-of-life 
index at time t, that takes into account two factors: the individual consumption c(t) and the 
work intensity N(t). The function N(t) represents the fraction of time individuals spent 
working and it is negatively related to their healthiness. The integral in (1) considers all future 
flows of the utility with the decreasing weight te ρ− , which means that the utility is valued less 
if it is received later. The given rate ρ>0 of individual time preference describes the intensity 
of this intertemporal preference and is called the impatience rate.  
The labor disutility parameter θ >0 describes health-related and other damages caused to 
individuals by their work (the disutility of work). It is incorporated in the utility function (1) 
in a linear manner6-8. At θ=0, the model (1)-(3) coincides with the standard economic model 
of individual behavior, which commonly assumes the logarithmic utility of consumption. A 
more comprehensive way to include health conditions in the utility function consists of 
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introducing the concept of health capital and health expenditures21. We keep here the simplest 
endogenous labour supply specification because the vintage structure to be introduced 
hereafter is itself complicated to manage analytically that it makes sense to start with this 
benchmark specification of labor disutility. 
The financial market is also assumed to be perfect, and the return to financial assets is 
equal to the interest rate r(t). The wealth accumulation of individuals is subjected to the 
following budget constraint  
 
          ),()()()()()(' tctNtwtAtrtA −+=                     (2) 
 
where A(t) is the individual’s total assets,  A(0) is given, and w(t) is a given wage rate for full 
employment.  
The decision variables of (1)-(2) are the consumption c(t), c(t) ≥0, and the employment 
level N(t) that satisfies the following constraint:  
 
              
 1)(0 ≤≤ tN ,                            (3) 
 
where the choice N(t)=0 occurs when the representative individual does not work, whereas 
N(t)=1 when they work the maximum allowed time and receive the full wage w. If the control 
N includes variation in the work effort, then it would not have an obvious upper bound N(t)=1 
but the nonnegativity requirement holds8. 
 
Analysis  
The analysis of the optimization problem (1)-(3) is quite standard8. The Hamiltonian of the 
problem (1)-(3) can be written as  
 
  ],'[][ln AcwNrANceH t −−++−= − λθρ                        (4) 
 
where )(tλ is the co-state variable associated with the wealth accumulation equation (2). The 
corresponding first order conditions for an interior maximum in c, N, A  are 
 
            
 ,/1 λρtec =
                                   (5) 
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,we t λθρ =−
                         (6)          
  ,rλλ =− &                                       (7) 
 
with the transversality condition   0)()(lim =
∞→
tAt
t
λ .                             
Substituting λ from (5) into (7), we obtain  
 
          .)(/' ρ−= trcc                                                                                      (8) 
 
Combining (5) and (6), we have the new optimality equation 
 
                                        cw θ= ,                                                   (9) 
 
that characterizes the optimal interior labor intensity.  
 
2.2 Model of firms undergoing technological improvements 
 
For clarity, we consider a population of working individuals of the constant size L. Then, 
following Section 2.1, LN(t) is the total labor supply from individuals, where the work 
intensity N(t) is determined by the individual workers and L is the maximal possible labor 
supply. 
The major assumption of the vintage capital models is the presence of ongoing 
technological change that makes new capital economically more efficient. As a result, the 
firms buy only new capital assets (vintages), capital deterioration can be neglected, and the 
assets are scrapped when they become economically obsolete. Let us consider the 
representative firm that produces Y(t) units of output, uses LN(t) units of available labour, 
invests I(t) into new capital, and seeks to maximize the firm’s discounted net profit15:  
 
,)()]()()()([max
0
,
dtttItLNtwtY
YI
µ−−∫
∞
                                   (11) 
 
where w(t) is the unit wage at time t, and µ(t) is the discounting factor, which depends on the 
stream of interest rate up to t according to: 
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                                  .)( 0
)( dssr
t
et
∫−
=µ                                                                                (12)   
 
The investment I(t) in (11) is measured in the units of output and the price of the new 
capital I(t) equals one. This follows naturally from our one-sector setting, which requires the 
cost of acquiring of one unit of capital to be equal to the production output of one capital unit. 
The production output Y is described by the vintage Leontief production function  
 
  ,)()(
)(
ττ dItY
t
ta
∫=                                                                   (13) 
and 
                              ,)(
)()(
)(
τ
τβ
τ dItLN
t
ta
∫=                                                                   (14) 
 
where a(t) is the oldest vintage in use at time t, LN(t) is the actual total labor supply that is 
used to operate all machines in use.  
By (13)-(14), one unit of capital of any vintage τ produces exactly one unit of output, but 
operating one unit of vintage τ  requires  )(/1 τβ  units of labor, where an increasing function 
β(t) reflects the labor-saving exogenous technical progress. There are no organizational 
aspects in the model (see an elementary example11, and a more comprehensive 22). Again, the 
study of the relation between work intensity and technological progress is already quite 
challenging in the vintage capital setting considered here.                                                           
The constraints of the firm optimization problem are given by the nonnegativity condition 
for the investment 
 
        I(t) ≥ 0,                                                                                       (15)  
 
and the standard requirement that scrapped machines cannot be reused:  
 
     a′(t) ≥ 0,       a(t) ≤  t.                                                                 (16) 
  
We shall also specify the initial conditions as follows: 
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a(0) = a0<0,   I (τ) = I 0(τ),  τ∈[a0,0].                                          (17) 
 
The optimization problem (11)-(17) includes three unknown functions I, a, and Y 
connected by equalities (13)-(14). The analysis of the problem (11)-(17) is not standard, 
nevertheless there are some developed techniques15,16,18  that can be extended to this case. 
Namely, since the total labor supply L(t) is constant, we can switch to the per capita variables 
y=Y/L, c=C/L, i=I/L and use the unknown function m = i/β following23. In the variables y, m, 
a, the optimization problem (11)-(17) becomes: 
 
,)()]()()()()([max
0
,,
dtttmttNtwty
amy
µβ−−∫
∞
                                (18) 
  ,)()()(
)(
τττβ dmty
t
ta
∫=                                                                     (19) 
                              ,)()(
)(
ττ dmtN
t
ta
∫=                                                                          (20) 
        m(t) ≥ 0,       a′(t) ≥ 0,       a(t) ≤  t,                                              (21)  
a(0) = a0<0,   m(τ) = m0(τ),  τ∈[a0,0].                                          (22) 
 
Analysis  
Let us choose m(t) and a(t), t∈[0,∞), to be the independent controls of the optimization 
problem (18)-(22) and consider the unknown functions y(t) to be the dependent (state) 
variable defined by (14). The necessary conditions15,16,18,20 for an interior extremum in the 
optimization problem (18)-(22) are:     
 
              
[ ] )()()()()(
)(1
ttdwt
ta
t
βµττβτµ =−∫
−
,                                                   (23) 
  )),(()( tatw β=                                   (24) 
 
where  a−1(t) is the inverse function of a(t).  
The equality (23) is the optimal investment rule for vintage capital models, and the 
equation (24) is the optimal scrapping condition: for the given wage w(t), it states that it is 
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optimal to scrap operating machines when their unit labor productivity ))(( taβ becomes equal 
the unit labor cost w(t).  
The optimization model (18)-(22) describes a firm’s dynamics under given wage and interest 
rates and is known as a partial equilibrium model. A quick look at the equations (23)-(24) 
shows that, in a general case, this model does not have interior trajectories over the entire 
planning horizon [0,∞) and possesses transitory corner regimes starting at t=015,16,18,19,24. The 
situation is quite different in the general equilibrium model analyzed in the next section, 
where the wage and interest rate are not given but are rather endogenous and determined by 
market equilibrium conditions. As it will be shown below, the interior regimes exist in the 
general equilibrium. 
 
2.3 Decentralized equilibrium model 
 
The concept of market equilibrium allows us to analyze the joint competitive behavior of the 
individuals governed by the optimization problem (1)-(3) and firms governed by the 
optimization problem (18)-(22). The individuals and firms face the given interest rate r and 
wage rate w, which are the same for both individuals and firms at the market equilibrium. The 
market equilibrium imposes certain additional relations among model variables (the so-called 
clearing market conditions). Namely, assuming that the economy is closed, the clearing 
condition for good market in our model is:  
 
y(t) = i(t) + c(t),                                                                          (25) 
 
which means that the firms’ output is spent in equilibrium on the new capital investment of 
firms and the consumption of individuals. The equality (14) is the clearing condition for the 
labor market, which means that the labor supply from workers is equal to the labor used by 
firms. The condition (14) reflects the fact that the labor supply N(t) is now endogenous.  
We define the equilibrium of the model (1)-(3),(18)-(22) as a trajectory (N(t), µ(t), m(t), 
a(t), y(t), c(t), r(t), w(t)) for 0≥t that solves the individuals’ optimization problem (1)-(3) and 
the firms’ optimization problem (18)-(22) when both, the good and labor markets, are 
clear.So, the equilibrium is described by the following system of eight nonlinear integral-
differential equations  
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ta
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−
,                                                   (29) 
  
))(()( tatw β= ,                              (30) 
                                             y(t) = c(t)  + β(t)m(t),                                                                 (31) 
                 ,1)()(0
)(
<=< ∫ ττ dmtN
t
ta
                                                             (32) 
)()( tctw θ=                                 (33) 
 
in eight unknowns N, µ, m, a, y, c, r, w with the initial conditions (22) and A(0). This system 
is quite challenging to analyze.  
We concentrate on interior solutions of the equilibrium problem (26)-(33). In contrast to 
the firms’ vintage models15,20,24, the existence of interior regimes is more likely in this system. 
Indeed, wages are no longer given, and the solution to the system is far from being obvious. 
Versions of the equilibrium model (26)-(33) under the fixed labor (at θ =0) are considered 
in[Bouc97, Bouc98] where some partial solutions are obtained for the optimal growth.  
In our model θ ≠0 and the addition of the endogenous labor supply N(t) significantly 
complicates the analysis of the involved dynamic system. Namely, in the model with fixed 
labor at θ =015,24, under a given past investment profile, the labor market equilibrium 
condition (32) allows us computing a(t), which determines wages by (30), and then 
identifying the interest rate µ as a solution to an advanced integral equation based on the 
optimal (interior) investment rule (29). This partial recursive algorithm is no longer possible 
in the system (26)-(33): the equilibrium condition (32) for the labor market has two unknowns 
for a given past investment profile: labor supply N(t) and the vintage index a(t).  
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3. Steady-state analysis and properties of balanced growth  
 
To get clear analytic results about the qualitative dynamics of our model, let us consider the 
decentralized equilibrium problem (26)-(33) when the exogenous technological change is 
exponential with a given rate γ>0:  
                                                     β(t) = Beγt.                                                              (34) 
  
Then, the system of eight equations (26)-(33) allows for the existence of a balanced growth 
trajectory (N, µ, m, a, y, c, r, w) that grows with the rate γ.  Namely, let us assume that 
,)( teyty γ=
 and tectc γ=)( , while t – a(t)=T =const. Then, m(t)= m =const by (31), N(t)= N
=const by (32),  w(t)= )( TtBe −γ  by (30), µ(t)= te )( ργ +−  by (30), and the system (26)-(33) leads to  
 
r(t) = γ +ρ = const,                                                            (35) 
mBcy += ,                                (36) 
γ
γTe
mBy
−
−
=
1
,                             (37) 
        
N = m T ,                                                                          (38) 
     111
)(
=
−
−
+
−
−
−
+−
ργρ
ρ
γ
γρ T
T
T e
e
e
,                  (39) 
  
,
TBec γ−=Θ
                              (40) 
 
with respect to the unknown constants ,y  m , N , c , r, and T .  
 
3.1 The existence of the balanced growth trajectory 
 
Equation (39) determines the constant optimal capital lifetime T under the given technological 
change rate γ.  It has appeared earlier in vintage models16,20. If T is known, then we can find all 
other components ,y m , N , c  of the balanced growth trajectory (35)-(40). The solvability of 
the equation (39) is given in the following lemma. 
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Lemma 1 Let ρ<1. For any given 0<γ<1−ρ,  the equation (39) has a unique positive solution 
T>0. The value T→∞ as γ→0 or γ→1−ρ, so T decreases in γ  for small γ and increases for 
larger γ. The value γT→−ln(1−ρ) as γ→0 and γT is larger for a larger γ.  
In particular, if ρ <<1 and γ <<1, then γ/2≈T .  
Proof. Let us denote the left-hand side of equation (39) as  F(T)= 
ργρ
ρ
γ
γρ T
T
T e
e
e −
−
+−
−
−
+
− 11 )(
. 
Now using the properties F(0)=0, )/(1)( γρ + →
∞→TTF ,  and observing that   
 
011)( )( >−=−−+=′
−
−−−
−
−+−
ρ
γ
ρ
γ
ρ
γργ
ρ
γγρ
T
TTT
T
TT eeee
e
eeTF , 
 
one can conclude that the function F(T) increases from F(0)=0 to F(∞)= )/(1 γρ + . Therefore, 
a finite solution T to (39) exists only if 1)/(1 >+ γρ , or .1 ργ −<  The solution is unique because 
the function F(T) is monotonic. It proves the first part of the lemma.  
If both 1<<ρ and 1<<γ , then applying the Taylor series up to the second order to the 
equation (39), we obtain 12/2 ≈Tγ or γ/2≈T . 
In order to understand relations among γ, T, and γT for an arbitrary ρ<1, let us introduce 
the auxiliary function G(T, γ )= 111
)(
−
−
−
+
−
−
−
+−
ργρ
ρ
γ
γρ T
T
T e
e
e
. Applying the Theorem of the 
Implicit Function to the equality G(T, γ )=0, we get 
 
( ) ( )
( ) .1 )/()/(1//
2)(
T
TTT
e
eeeT
TG
G
d
dT
ρ
ργγρ
γ
γρργργγ
γ −
−+−
−
+−−+−
−=
∂∂
∂∂
−=  
 
Now, calculating and estimating the derivative 
 
( )( ) ,0)(11)()( )(2
2
>+−−
−+
=+= +−
−
−
γρ
γρ
ρ
γ
γ
γ
γ γρ
ρ
ρ
T
T
T
e
e
e
d
dTT
d
Td
 
 
we obtain that the value γT monotonically increases in γ for any 0<γ<1−ρ. Next, presenting 
the equation (39) in the form 
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( )
,1)(
11 )(
=
+
−
−
−
+−−
γρρ
γ
ρ
γρρ TT ee
 
 
we see that the value γT→−ln(1−ρ)>0 as γ→+0.  Correspondingly, T→∞ as γ→0. Finally, 
since the value γT remains finite as γ→+0, the above derivative dT/dγ→-∞ as γ→+0. 
Therefore, the value T decreases in γ  for certain small values γ, but it increases for a larger 
γ  because T→∞ at γ→(1−ρ).  The lemma is proven.                                                         
 
The lemma shows that the balanced growth capital lifetime T is a decreasing function of 
the technological progress rate γ, when γ is small enough. The lemma also provides a clear 
statement of the non-monotonic dependence T(γ), not covered in previous papers17,19,23,25 on 
related models. Nonetheless, from now on, we only concentrate on the realistic 
parameterizations of the model when both given rates ρ and γ are small enough. Then, a 
technological acceleration shortens the lifetime of capital goods T.  
Once (39) has a unique solution T, the whole balanced growth trajectory is uniquely 
determined as explained above. Excluding mcy ,,  from equations (23)-(25) and (27), we get  
T
T
e
TeN γ
γ
γ
γ
−
−
−−Θ
=
1
1
.                         (41) 
 
Using Lemma 1 and the formula (41) with the constraints (3), we obtain the following result.  
 
Theorem 1 (about the balanced growth).  At the given exponential technological change  
(34), the decentralized equilibrium (26)-(33) possesses a unique balanced growth trajectory :  
 
t–a(t)=T =const,   m(t)= N /T ,                                                 (42) 
r(t)= γ +ρ = const,          w(t)= )( TtBe −γ  ,                                     (43) 
t
T
e
T
eBNty γ
γ
γ
−
−
=
1)( ,                             (44) 
t
T
e
Be
tc γ
γ
θ
−
=)( ,                             (45) 
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where T is determined by the equation (39).  
If 
  
T
T
e
Te
γ
γ
γ
γθ
−
−
−−
>
1
,                           (46) 
 
then the optimal N  is interior: 0< N <1 and given by (41). The optimal N  is corner N =1, if 
(46) fails. At γ<ρ<<1, the condition (46) is )()1( 1 γγ o+−>Θ − . 
 
In summary, the balanced dynamics of the firm’s optimization problem remains 
essentially the same as in model15 with exogenous technological progress and inelastic labor 
supply, because the key scrapping equation (39) is the same in both models. Specifically, the 
firm’s renovation dynamics is the same as for a reduced total labor supply given by the 
endogenous work intensity 0<N<1 instead of N=1.  
 
We now proceed to the analysis of the impact of technological progress on the optimal 
work intensity. The properties of consumption, output and investment, which are not the focus 
of this paper, are reported in the appendix for the sake of completeness.  
 
3.2 The existence and analysis of the interior endogenous work intensity level 
 
If the parameter θ  is not large: θ ≤1, then the optimal individual work intensity (employment 
level) N is always boundary: N =1, i.e., people choose to work maximum possible hours. For 
the values of the parameter θ, larger than its critical value θˆ  determined by (46), the optimal 
N <1 can be interior, i.e., people can choose to work less (but always N >0). The key 
formulas (41) and (46) can be simplified in the following practically important case.  
 
Corollary 1: For small γ and ρ: γ<ρ<<1, the critical value of the labor disutility parameter 
is 1)1(ˆ −−= γθ . At θθ ˆ> , the optimal work intensity level N  is interior:  
 
.)1(
1
γθ −
≈N                              (47) 
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That is, at θθ ˆ> , people voluntary choose to work less than maximum hours. The work 
intensity N increases when the rate γ of technological progress rises. 
 
Proof. Let us rewrite formula (41) as  
 
1)1(
1
−−
= Te
TN γγ
γ
θ
.                         (48) 
 
If 1<<ρ and 1<<γ , then γγ 2≈T by Lemma 1 and, applying the Taylor series up to second 
order to the exponent in (48), we obtain 12/2 ≈Tγ  and  
 
   ( ) ,21 111221
21
12/221)1(
21
2 γγγθγγγγγγ
γ
θγγγ
γ
θ
−−
=
−−−−++
=
−++−
=N  
 
which gives (47). The corollary is proven.                                                                    
 
The case with no technological progress, γ =0:  
The optimal controls in the firm’s optimization problem (11)-(17) at γ =0 are m=0 and 
a=a0
16,23,25
, which leads to the optimal steady-state values m =0, c θ =B, y = c =B N , while 
the modified zero-profit optimality condition for firms gives y = w N , i.e., w = B. Hence, N  
= 1/θ. So, when θ >1, then the employment N  = 1/θ  is less than maximal and 
correspondingly, the real consumption c = w/θ  is less than the full-time maximal wage w.   
A similar picture occurs when the technological progress rate γ is small, but then the real 
consumption c   is larger than the consumption c = w/θ  at γ=0 because of technological 
innovations.   
 
The previous corollary has two interesting results. First of all, optimal work intensity 
depends on two fundamental parameters, θ and γ, specifically, the disutility of work and the 
rate of embodied technological progress. If the working conditions are good enough, which 
does occur when the parameter θ is below a well defined threshold, then the individuals might 
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devote all their time endowment to work. The existence of such a corner regime is obviously 
due to the linearity of the utility function with respect to the control N. This result highlights 
the essential role of the working conditions in the balance work-life problem. Second, when 
the working conditions are not good enough, then the individuals are willing to work only a 
fraction of time. This fraction of time decreases when the working conditions worsen (when 
θ  increases) but goes up if embodied technological progress accelerates (when γ increases).  
It is also worth to point out that the θ-threshold value is increasing in the rate of embodied 
technical progress γ. Indeed, because acceleration in the technological progress rate increases 
labor income, which in turns rises consumption opportunities, it more than “balances” the 
disutility of work. As a result, individuals choose larger work intensity. At a more aggregate 
level, one may interpret the previous result as an employment increases with the rate of 
embodied technological progress γ. In the standard models6-8 with labor/leisure choice, a rise 
in γ also increases (voluntary) employment. This property is much less obvious in our vintage 
model. Indeed, since N = m T , the impact of employment on the technological acceleration is 
ambiguous in our vintage capital set-up because the capital lifetime goes down in response to 
the shock while the latter is likely to stimulate investments, resulting in an ambiguous labor 
demand. For small enough γ, one can check that the second effect dominates, which in turn 
yields a globally positively responsive labor demand, as in some other models6-8.  
As suggested in the introduction section, the embodied nature of the technological 
progress conveyed by the information technologies does not seem to reverse the relationship 
between the rate of technological progress and work intensity and employment observed in 
the traditional models though the economic mechanisms at work are more complex. This 
should not be seen as a problem but as a good property of vintage models. Indeed, except for 
certain countries with labor market regulation clearly pushing for shorter working time (like 
France), the majority of advanced countries (including the US) have not experienced a 
decrease in total working hours since the 1990s, the golden age of information technologies.                                                                   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we explore the relationship between optimal work intensity and embodied 
technological progress. The latter type of technical progress is consistent with technical 
innovations inherent in information technologies. We study the problem in vintage capital 
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formalism, which is adequate to model embodied technological progress. We have shown 
that, though the economic mechanisms at work in vintage capital models are far more 
complex than in traditional models with homogenous capital, the embodied nature of 
technological progress does not seem to reverse the positive correlation between work 
intensity and the rate of technological progress traditionally observed.  
Needless to say, our results should be properly qualified. A major drawback from our 
approach is that (for simplicity sake) we have not incorporated organizational changes, a 
major trend in era of information technologies10. If organizational changes (towards more 
flexibilization) are thought to worsen the working conditions, then the increase in wages 
following technical accelerations is mitigated by the induced worse working conditions (in the 
language of our model, the parameters θ and γ are no longer independent, θ increases with γ).  
In this case, our main results should be carefully amended.  
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Appendix: The properties of optimal consumption, output and investment 
 
In vintage capital models with exogenous labor17,19,20,24, the optimal output is smaller for larger 
values of γ, namely, a technological acceleration raises the investment but decreases the 
output and consumption. The situation is more complicated now because the employment N  
is endogenous and  also depends on γ  by (41). There are two conflicting forces when γ  goes 
up: one pushing output level up through the stimulation of investment in new machines, and 
another one going in the opposite direction via the drop in the lifetime of capital goods, the 
latter being predominant. The endogenous work intensity is the third such force. The size of 
the negative effect is unchanged because the balanced capital lifetime T is unaffected by the 
endogenization of a labor supply (T is determined by the same equation in the two cases).  
Therefore, because m(t)= N /T , investment is stimulated by the rise in γ for two reasons: the 
machines are scrapped earlier (the denominator goes down) and the work intensity goes up 
(numerator goes up). Because of capital/labor complementarity and the positive effect on 
employment of a higher rate γ,  the endogenization of the labor supply reinforces the 
stimulating effect of technological progress on the investment level.  Therefore, the positive 
impact of higher γ on output level is larger than in the models with exogenous labor. The 
following proposition shows that the total effect on output level will remain qualitatively the 
same. 
 
Corollary 2.  If γ <ρ <<1, then the levels of optimal output and consumption are smaller for 
larger values of γ while the investment level increases.  
Proof. We focus here on the impact of higher γ  on the output level y , which is the most 
complicated part of the proof. Substituting N  and γ/2≈T  into (44), we obtain that 
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where x=γT. The differentiation of f (x) gives  
 
.)2/1(
2/)2/1)(1()(' 22
22
xe
xexxee
e
B
xf
x
xxx
x
−−
−++−−
Θ
=
−
−−−
−
 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By Lemma 1, γγ 2≈T  is small at small γ. Presenting xe−  as the Taylor series, we obtain  
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Hence, f ’(x) <0 at small x and γ. The corollary is proven.                                              
 
Thus, the endogenous scrapping mechanism inherent to the vintage capital model is 
quantitatively strong enough, so that exogenous technological accelerations dominate the 
impact of partial voluntary unemployment on output level.  
